In this paper we first give an elementary proof of existence of equilibrium with dividends in an economy with possibly satiated consumers. We then introduce a no-arbitrage condition and show that it is equivalent to the existence of equilibrium with dividends.
Introduction
In the Arrow -Debreu model (1954) , the authors impose a nonsatiation assumption which states that for every consumer,whatever the commodity bundle may be, there exists another consumption bundle she/he strictly prefers. It is well-known, that in presence of satiation, a Walras equilibrium may not exist since for every price, there could be a consumer who maximizes her/his preference in the interior of her/his budget set. In presence of financial assets, satiation is rather a rule than an exception. Both the mean-variance CAPM and the expected-utility model with negative returns exhibit satiation (see e.g. Nielsen (1989) , Dana, Le Van and Magnien (1997) , Section 5).
1
The absence of the nonsatiation condition with fixed prices was studied by Drèze and Muller (1980) by introducing the notion of coupons equilibrium, Aumann and Drèze (1986) with the concept of dividends, Mas-Colell (1992) who used the term of slack equilibrium. In Debreu (1959, Theory of Value), the notion of an equilibrium relative to the price system can be viewed as an equilibrium with possibly negative dividends. We can cite other authors who worked on nonsatiation: e.g. Makarov (1981) , Kajii (1996) , Florig and Yildiz (2002) , Konovalov (2005) , and for a continuum of consumers, Cornet, Topuzu and Yildiz (2003) .
In this paper we first give an easy proof of existence of equilibria with dividends. For Aumann and Drèze, a dividend is a "cash allowance added to the budget by each trader. Its function is to distribute among the nonsatiated agents the surplus created by the failure of the satiated agents to use their entire budget". Here, we introduce an additional good (e.g. financial asset, or paper money) that the satiated agents will want to have in order to fill up their budget sets. For that, they will buy this additional good from the nonsatiated agents. More precisely, we will introduce an intermediary economy by adding another good that any agent would like to have if she/he meets satiation. In this economy, the nonsatiation condition is satisfied. There thus exists a Walras equilibrium. We show that this equilibrium actually corresponds to an equilibrium with dividends for the initial economy. It is interesting to notice that we show that, at this equilibrium, the satiated agents will buy the additional good from the nonsatiated agents and if an agent is not satiated then the value of the additional good will be zero for that agent. It is important to note that the idea to introduce an additional good is not new when one considers the equilibrium with paper money of Kajii (1996) . What is new in this paper is the mechanism of exchange: it is defined clearly with well-defined partial extended preferences that the satiated consumers who meet satiation points will buy additional good from the consumers who do not meet satiation.
Second, we allow our model to have financial assets. If we assume that the production sets satisfy in particular the inaction and irreversibility conditions (see Debreu, 1959) Page, 2002) , then there exists an equilibrium with dividends iff there exists a no-arbitrage price. Usually, no-arbitrage conditions are introduced in an exchange economy with financial markets. Here, we introduce a no-arbitrage condition in an economy with production. We think of two-period models where firms produce consumption goods using capital goods and the consumers buy, in the first period, consumption goods and assets. An opportunity of arbitrage is a system of prices of commodities (consumption goods or assets) for which, either at least one consumer, without cost, can increase without bound her/his consumption, or one firm produces more and more because her/his profit increases without bound.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. The main result is given in Section 3. In Section 4, we introduce the noarbitrage price condition and prove that existence of equilibrium is equivalent to existence of no-arbitrage prices. In Section 5, Appendix 1 gives a proof of Theorem 2 of Section 3. In Section 6, Appendix 2 presents an example of economies with production where the no-arbitrage condition is satisfied.
The Model
We consider an economy having l goods, J producers, and I consumers. We suppose that the numbers of the producers and the consumers are finite. For each i ∈ I, let X i ⊂ R l denote the set of consumption goods, let u i : X i −→ R denote the utility and let e i ∈ R l be the initial endowment. Furthermore for each j ∈ J, let Y j ⊂ R l denote the producing set of the producer j.
Let θ ij be the ratio of the profit that consumer i can get from the producer j. We suppose that 0 ≤ θ ij ≤ 1, i∈I θ ij = 1. Let p ∈ R l denote the price of the goods.
In the sequel we will denote this economy by
Definition 2
An equilibrium with dividends
Definition 3
A feasible allocation is the list
We denote by A the set of feasible allocations and by A i the projection of A on the i th component.
The main purpose of this paper is to give an easy proof of existence of equilibrium with dividends of economy E when satiation points occur in the preferences of the consumers. Our idea is to introduce an intermediary economy with an additional good (think of financial asset or money paper) that the consumers want to possess when they meet satiation. In this new economy, there is no satiation point. Hence, an equilibrium exists under appropriate assumptions. We show that this equilibrium is an equilibrium with dividends for the initial economy. It is worth to point out that at this equilibrium point, the consumers who meet satiation points will buy the additional good from the consumers who do not meet satiation.
The Assumptions
We now list our assumptions. (H 1 ) For each i ∈ I, the set X i is nonempty closed convex;
(H 2 ) For each i ∈ I, the function u i is strictly quasiconcave and upper semicontinuous;
(2) Assumption (H 3 ) can be relaxed as follows: for each j ∈ J, the set Y j is nonempty and the total production set Y = j Y j is closed and convex (see Remark 5 (1) below).
(3) Assumption (H 4 ) is satisfied when the consumption sets are the positive orthant R l + , the production sets satisfy 0 ∈ Y j , ∀j, the total production set satisfies Y ∩ (−Y ) = {0} (irreversibility) and Y ∩ R l + = {0} (one cannot produce without using input). It is also satisfied in a financial exchange economy with strictly concave utility functions and a no-arbitrage condition (see e.g. Page (1987) or Page and Wooders (1996) ). We give in Appendix 2 two examples of economies with production and assets where the no-arbitrage condition is satisfied. (4) Assumption (H 5 ) ensures that any quasi-equilibrium is actually an equilibrium.
The Results
We first give an existence of Walras equilibrium theorem when there exists no satiation.
then there exists a quasi-equilibrium.
(ii) If we add H 5 and
then there exists an equilibrium.
Proof. We adapt the proof given in Dana, Le Van and Magnien (1999) for an exchange exconomy. A detailed proof is given in Appendix 1.
We now come to our main result which is a corollary of the previous theorem.
Then there exists an equilibrium with dividends.
Proof. Let us introduce the intermediary economy
for any j ∈ J, and the utilities u i are defined as follows (recall that S i is the set of satiation points for agent i): let µ > 0,
We will check that Assumption (H 2 ) is satisfied for every u i . To prove that u i is quasi-concave and upper semi-continuous, it suffices to prove that the setL
≥ α} is closed and convex for every α. We have two cases:
The converse is obvious.
It is also obvious that S i is closed and convex. We have proved that u i is upper semicontinuous and quasi-concave for every i. We now prove that u i is strictly quasi-concave.
, we can consider the following cases:
Since u i is a strictly quasi-concave function, we obtain
This follows u i (x i ) > u i (x i ). Similarly as above we consider
We have proved that the functionû i is strictly quasi-concave. It remains to prove that theû i has no satiation point.
We consider the following cases
We have proved that theû i has no satiation point. Let us consider the feasible set A of E. We have:
It is obvious that A is compact. It is also obvious that Assumptions (H 1 ), (H 2 ), (H 3 ) are fulfilled in economy E. Apply Theorem 2, part (i). There exists a quasi-equilibrium (x * i , d * i ) i∈I , (y * j , 0) j∈J , (p * , q * ) with (p * , q * ) = (0, 0). It satisfies:
and (iii) for any j ∈ J, p * · y * j = sup(p * · Y j ). Observe that since µ > 0, the price q * must be nonnegative. We claim that (x * i ) i∈I , (y * j ) j∈J , p * ) is an equilibrium with dividends (q * δ i ) i∈I . Indeed, first, we have
We claim that
Assume the contrary, i.e. p * .x i = p * .e i + j∈J θ ij sup p * .Y j + (q * δ i ).
(
Then, since
This means that there exists
Let
for every λ sufficiently small. On the other hand, from (1) and (2) we have (3) and (4) contradict the fact that (x * i , d * i ) i∈I , (y * j , 0) j∈J , (p * , q * ) is a quasi-equilibrium of the intermediary economy.
and p * = 0.
Suppose that every consumer is non-satiated. Then an equilibrium with dividends will be reduced to a Walras equilibrium. That is the dividend is zero and the equilibrium price is non-zero.
Proof. First, we prove that, if x * i is not a satiation point, then q * d * i = 0.
For any λ ∈ ]0, 1[ , from the strict quasi-concavity of u i , we have
Letting λ converge to zero, we obtain q * d * i ≤ 0. Thus q * d * i = 0. That means that a consumer who does not meet satiation point will sell her/his endowment of the additional good if q * > 0. Observe also that p * = 0 (if not we have 0 = q * δ i ; this implies q * = 0 : a contradiction with (p * , q * ) = 0). One deduces from that, if x * i is not a satiation point for every i ∈ I, then q * = 0, since i∈I d i = i∈I δ i > 0. In this case, p * = 0, and ((x * i ) i∈I , (y * j ) j∈J , p * ) is a Walras equilibrium.
Remark 5 (1) We can replace (H 3 ) by (H 3 bis): "The total production set j∈J Y j is closed, non-empty and convex" as in Florig and Yildiz (2002) , i.e., we do not require every Y j be convex. Indeed, we replace the sets Y j by their closed convex hulls coY j . Let ((x * i ), (y * j ), p * ) be an equilibrium with dividends (d * i ) of this new economy. This implies that every y * j is in coY j . It is obvious that for any j
By assumption, j Y j is closed and convex. We then have j Y j = j coY j 1 . Hence there exist (ζ * j ) ∈ Π j Y j such that j ζ * j = j y * j . Since i x * i = i e i + j y * j , and since p * · ζ * j ≤ p * · y * j , ∀j, we must have p * · ζ * j = p * · y * j = max p * · Y j for every j. That means that ((x * i ), (ζ * j ), p * ) is an equilibrium with dividends for the initial economy.
(2) Let I 1 = {i ∈ I : x * i is not a satiation point} , and I 2 = I I 1 . From Corollary 4, q * d * i = 0, for any i ∈ I 1 . Thus i∈I 1 q * δ i = i∈I 2 q * .d * i − i∈I 2 q * δ i . This shows that the group of agents who meet satiation buy the additional good from the group of agents who do not meet satiation.
No-arbitrage condition and existence of equilibrium with dividends
If we assume that 0 ∈ Y j for every j, and if ((x * i ) i∈I , (y * j ) j∈J , p * ) is an equilibrium with dividends, we will have
Hence, for every i, we have u i (x * i ) ≥ u i (e i ). We therefore define the set of individually rational feasible allocations A. More precisely:
We will replace (H 4 ) by (H 4 bis) The set A is compact. We have the following result:
Then there exists a Walras equilibrium. (ii)Assume (H 1 ), (H 2 ), (H 3 ), (H 4 bis), (H 5 ) and for every j, 0 ∈ Y j . Then there exists an equilibrium with dividends.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Theorem 2. One just replaces the feasible set A by the set of individually rational feasible allocations A.
, and W i be the recession cone of P i . Elements in W i which are different from zero will be called useful vectors for agent i (see Werner,1987) . Let Z j denote the recession cone of Y j . Take some γ j ∈ Y j . Then γ j + λz j ∈ Y j , ∀λ ≥ 0, ∀z j ∈ Z j . We call useful production vector for firm j any vector z j ∈ Z j \ {0} (the producer can produce an infinitely large quantity γ j + λz j , λ ≥ 0).
Let p ∈ R l . We say that there exists an opportunity of arbitrage associated with p if either there exists i ∈ I, w i ∈ W i \ {0} , such that p.w i ≤ 0, or there exists j ∈ J, z j ∈ Z j , such that p.z j > 0. In other words, with such a price p, either the consumer i will increase without bounds her/his consumption or firm j will produce an infinite quantity.
A price vector p ∈ R l is a no-arbitrage price for the economy if ∀i ∈ I,
We introduce the following No-Arbitrage Condition:
(N A) There exists a no-arbitrage price for the economy. 
Then:
is an equilibrium with dividends ⇒ p * is a no-arbitrage price.
Proof. (i) It suffices to prove that A is compact. Assume the contrary. Then there is a sequence (x n i ) i , y n j j n=1,..,∞
We can assume, without loss of generality, that
Moreover, we have
Let p be a no-arbitrage price. If (w i ) i = 0, we have a contradiction: 0 < p. i w i = p. j z j ≤ 0. If (w i ) i = 0, then j z j = 0. We have:
This implies z j = 0. We have shown that, in this case, we have (z j ) j = 0 and a contradiction with (w i ) i , (z j ) j = 0.
We have proved that A is compact.
(ii) Let ((x * i ) i∈I , (y * j ) j∈J , p * ) be an equilibrium with dividends. It is obvious that p * .z j ≤ 0, for every z j ∈ Z j since y * j + z j ∈ Y j and p * .y * j = max p * .Y j .
14
We have two cases. Case 1. There exists some i ∈ I such that x * i is not a satiation point. From
is an equilibrium, we have p * .w i > 0. Case 2. For any i ∈ I, x * i is a satiation point. Condition (N HL) implies that W i = {0} , for every i. No-arbitrage Condition is satisfied in this case with p * .
Remark 9
The No Halfline Condition is satisfied with strictly concave functions.
5 Appendix 1: Proof of Theorem 2
Gale-Nikaido-Debreu Lemma
We will make use of the following lemma the proof of which can be found in Florenzano and Le Van (1986):
Lemma 10 (Gale-Nikaido-Debreu) Let P be a closed nonempty convex cone in the linear space R l . Let P 0 be the polar cone of P and S be the unit sphere in R l . Suppose that the multivalued mapping Z from S ∩ P to R l is upper semicontinuous and Z(p) is nonempty convex compact. Suppose further that for every p ∈ S ∩ P, ∃z ∈ Z(p) such thar p.z ≤ 0. Then there exists p ∈ S ∩ P satisfying
Proof of Theorem 2
We consider a sequence of truncated economies. Let B(0, n) denote the ball centered at 0 with radius n. Let
where i ∈ I, j ∈ J. Since e i ∈ X i , we have e i ∈ X n i for all n is large enough. For every (p, q) ∈ S ∩ (R l × R + ), where S is the unit sphere of R l+1 , define the multivalued mapping
Under the assumptions mentioned in Theorem 2 we have the following lemma:
Lemma 11 For each i ∈ I the mapping Q n i is upper semicontinuous having nonempty compact convex values.
Proof. From the definition it is easy to see that ξ n i is upper semicontinuous having nonempty convex compact values. From the definition of the mapping Q n i we have the following properties: Let x ∈ ξ n i (p, q) and u i (x) = max u i (x i ), with x i ∈ ξ n i (p, q) then x ∈ Q n i (p, q). Indeed, let x i ∈ X n i and u i (x i ) > u i (x), then x i / ∈ ξ n i (p, q). Hence by the definition of this set we have p.x i ≥ p.e i + j∈J θ ij n j (p)+q, and therefore x ∈ Q n i (p, q). This implies that Q n i (p, q) nonempty for every (p, q) ∈ S∩(R l ×R + ). For every x i , y i ∈ Q n i (p, q) and λ ∈ [0, 1], since ξ n i (p, q) is convex we have λx i +(1−λ)y i ∈ ξ n i (p, q). On the other hand, since u i is strictly quasiconcave,
). Hence, for each x i ∈ X n i and u i (x i ) > u i (λx i + (1 − λ)y i ), it follows that u i (x i ) > min(u i (x i ), u i (y i )). Thus p.x i ≥ p.e i + j∈J θ ij n j (p) + q. Hence λx i + (1 − λ)y i ∈ Q n i (p, q) which means that Q n i (p, q) is convex. The mapping Q n i is closed. Indeed, let (p k , q k , x k i ) ∈ graphQ n i and assume that (p k , q k ) → (p, q), x k i → x i . Since x k i ∈ Q n i (p k , q k ) ⊂ ξ n i (p k , q k ) and ξ n i is closed, we have x i ∈ ξ n i (p, q). On the other hand, let x i ∈ X i n with u i (x i ) > u i (x i ) , by the upper semicontinuity of u i we see that u i (x i ) > u i (x k i ) for all k large enough. Since x k i ∈ Q n i (p k , q k ), we have This implies that x i ∈ Q n i (p, q). Hence Q n i is closed. But, since Q n i (p, q) ⊂ ξ n i (p, q) ⊂ X n i for all (p, q) ∈ S ∩ (R l × R + ), n ≥ 1 and X n i is compact, we see that Q n i is a compact mapping. Hence Q n i is upper semicontinuous.
a) Under assumptions (H 1 ) − (H 4 ) we now show that there exists quasiequilibrium. Let Φ n j (p) denote the solution-set of n j (p), that means y j ∈ Φ n j (p) if and only if p.y j = max p.Y j n . Define the mapping z n by setting, for each (p, q) ∈ S ∩ (R l × R + ), where S stands for the unit sphere in R l+1 . By virtue of Lemma 11, from the assumptions of the theorem it is easy to see that z n is upper semicontinuous having nonempty convex compact values. Note that for any x in z n (p, q) we can write x = ( i∈I x n i − i∈I e i − j∈J y n j ) × (−|I|) where x n i ∈ Q n i (p, q) and y n j ∈ Φ j n (p). Since x n i ∈ Q n i (p, q), that implies In contrary we suppose that p * .x i = p * .e i + j∈J θ ij p * .y * j .
we have inf p * .(X i −
